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ABSTRACT:  AGRICULTURE IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE1
Jonathan M. Harris
jonathan.harris@tufts.edu
  In the twenty-first century, it is evident that world agricultural systems will have to supply sufficient
food for a population somewhere between 7.5 and 12 billion.  Projections for world agriculture in the first
half of the twenty-first century very widely, largely depending on assumptions about yield growth.   An
investigation of the patterns of yield growth for major cereal crops offers evidence that the pattern is logistic,
implying that an upper limit to yields is being approached.   This pattern is consistent with ecological limits
on soil fertility, water availability, and nutrient uptake.   It is also evident that current agricultural production
is imposing serious strains on ecosystems, with widespread soil degradation, water overdraft and pollution,
and ecological impacts such as loss of biodiversity and the proliferation of resistant pest species.   
The issue therefore is not simply the balance of supply and demand in agriculture.   It is the need
to develop ecologically sustainable agricultural systems which can provide an agricultural output about twice
present aggregate levels (allowing for per capita growth in consumption).  This level of output would
support a population of about 8 billion.   In addition, a population policy which can avert any much higher
growth is essential.
Evidence exists to show that ecologically sustainable cropping systems can supply overall outputs
comparable to intensive high-input agriculture.   (The measure of overall output is distinct from the more
commonly used measure of single-crop yields.)   This evidence, however, is more compelling for temperate
zones with good soils.   Much more research is needed on sustainable agriculture for tropical and arid
zones.   Agricultural policies need to be reformulated to meet the new goal of sustainability.   These
sustainable agriculture policies must be developed in tandem with population policies to ensure that
population growth remains in the lower ranges of current projections. G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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1.  TWO PERSPECTIVES ON AGRICULTURAL CARRYING CAPACITY
Ecologists and economists view agriculture through different lenses.   From the point of view of the
economist, agriculture is a sector of the economy, to be managed with the goal of increasing production
to meet growing consumer demand.  In economic models, technological progress in agriculture is the key
to continual growth in output.   From the ecologist's side, agroecosystems are seen as modifications of
natural ecosystems, subject to the same biophysical principles which govern all plant and animal
ecosystems.   Human consumers of food are not independent of the ecosystem, but a part of it like other
animal populations, and constrained by the system's carrying capacity.
The enormous achievements of human technology, in agriculture and elsewhere, have accentuated
the differences between these two points of view.   The Green Revolution and other technologically-driven
increases in agricultural productivity have enabled human populations to achieve a continual increase in
regional and global carrying capacities.   Indeed, from the point of view of most economists, the concept
of carrying capacity applied to humans is virtually meaningless.   Economic growth models admit no upper
limits to production, but envision steadily increasing output.   Declining income elasticities for food
consumption do limit the agricultural requirements of a given population, but so long as population continues
to increase, output must grow.   This growth can be achieved by increasing productivity; most economic
models  accordingly project a technological solution to any Malthusian threat resulting from global
population growth.
An ecological perspective, on the other hand, suggests that human production, in agriculture and
other areas, must ultimately be subject to biophysical limits.   In addition, well before carrying capacity limits
are reached, the implications of large-scale human intervention in complex ecosystems may include negative
feedbacks which can undermine the resilience and sustainability of these systems.   The conflict between
the drive for greater production and the entropic nature of physical systems is especially evident in
agriculture, where the process of production is inherently linked with natural biological and physical
processes.   The underlying paradigm conflict between economics and ecology accounts for the marked
differences in analysis and policy recommendations regarding agricultural futures.  
Not all economists are growth optimists, however.   Several decades ago, Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen explored the implications of entropic limits for economic systems (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971).
Since then, economists such as Herman Daly have expounded on the impossibility of unlimited growth in
a closed planetary ecosystem, and argued for an ecological economics which takes account of biophysical
limits (Daly 1991, 1996).   An ecological economics perspective has been applied to agricultural
production, for example in analyses by Juan Martinez-Alier and Vaclav Smil of the relationship of regional
and global agricultural production to the nitrogen cycle and other physico-chemical limits (Martinez-Alier,G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
     
2 Daly and Martinez-Alier are economists;  Smil is an interdisciplinary scholar dealing with relationships between
economics, energy, and environment.   The field of ecological economics has brought together economists,
ecologists and geographers, as well as scholars in other disciplines such as history and philosophy, to explore new
paradigms for analysis of the interaction between human economic activity and the environment.
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1991; Smil, 1994, 1996)2.   These studies, like earlier work on agricultural carrying capacity by Gilland
(1979), identify crucial biophysical constraints on agricultural expansion.   
Do these constraints mean that the world is approaching carrying capacity in agriculture?   A
number of studies, including several by Worldwatch Institute (Brown, 1994, 1995, 1997) and my own
recent article in Ecological Economics (Harris, 1996), have suggested that the answer is yes.   On the other
hand, studies published by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Council for
Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) are generally optimistic that meeting future food needs will
be possible and even "increasingly easy" (Mitchell and Ingco, 1995;  Waggoner, 1994).   Some analysts,
such as David Norse (1994) take a middle position, arguing that predictions of unprecedented food security
crises are excessively simplistic, but that technological optimism understates the importance of ecological
stresses.   Norse does, however, imply some carrying capacity limit, which he estimates to be in the range
of 12 billion people. 
The wide divergence in projections of agricultural futures can be traced to the different
methodological perspectives of ecological and neoclassical economics.   Neoclassical models are oriented
toward incremental growth without inherent limits; ecological models start from the premise that there are
inherent limits to the capture and use of solar energy and planetary resources.   This paper presents some
initial empirical evidence on global and regional trends in agricultural productivity in the major cereal crops
of maize, wheat, and rice; these trends are found to be more consistent with the existence of ecological
limits than with models based on technology- and input-driven growth.  The concluding section discusses
some of the policy implications of the introduction of ecological limits into models of agricultural growth.
2.   LOGISTIC VS EXPONENTIAL GROWTH PATTERNS
Econometric models, such as those employed by contributors to the IFPRI study, generally base
future agricultural production estimates on an assumed rate of yield growth.   This yield growth is presumed
to be a result of continuing technological improvement and investment in agriculture.   Historical growth
rates are used as a baseline for estimating future growth rates, (although the estimated future growth rates
may be lower than historically observed rates, depending on the model).   The result is that these models
generally display exponential growth in yields over time.   This is the crucial factor from which their mostlyG-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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optimistic conclusions about future supply/demand balance are derived.   Since most population projections
show population following a logistic growth path towards eventual stabilization, even a modest sustained
exponential rate of growth in yields will provide a comfortable, and increasing, margin over population
growth, thus accommodating increased per capita consumption.   In these models, no ceiling or carrying
capacity limit appears.   Their conclusions, accordingly, flow directly from their methodological assumption
of exponential growth in yields.
An approach more oriented to the concept of carrying capacity limits would suggest, instead, a
logistic path for crop yields, with some upper limit imposed.   In its early stages, a logistic growth path
closely resembles an exponential path.   But as the upper limit starts to exert more influence, the growth rate
slows, passes through an inflection point, and ultimately approaches zero as the carrying capacity is
approached.   This suggests that econometric modelers may be misled by an apparently exponential pattern
of yield increase, failing to discern an incipient logistic pattern -- an error which would have increasingly
severe consequences as the time period under consideration was increased.
Of course, the seriousness of such an error would depend on the upper limit in question.  Paul
Waggoner, one of the most optimistic forecasters, does use a logistic projection for maize yields
(Waggoner, 1994).   For his upper limit on maize yields, he uses a yield of 21 metric tons per hectare
(Mt/ha), which is close to the theoretical photosynthetic limit on yields, and is about three times the average
maize yield in the United States today.   His justification for this high limit is that agricultural contest winners
have actually achieved this yield level, proving it to be technically possible.   If we make a general
assumption that ultimate limits on cereal yields are three times present U.S. levels -- given than the
developing world currently has average yields less than one-half of U.S. levels -- the resulting factor of
about six gives plenty of room to accommodate the demands of a population of eight to twelve billion,
which is roughly the range envisioned in U.N. population projections for 2050 (United Nations, 1996).
There are good grounds for extreme skepticism regarding Waggoner's assumption that such high
yield levels could ever be achieved in practice, as average yields over large regions.  The theoretical genetic
potentials of plant physiology are commonly constrained by unfavorable physicochemical environments
(Boyer, 1982).   Record yields such as those cited by Waggoner have generally taken place on soils with
no significant productivity limitations;  but Boyer finds that only 12% of U.S. soils are in this category. 
Global soils are generally subject to more stresses and productivity constraints than is characteristic of the
major U.S. crop-growing areas (see e.g. Pimentel 1993, Buol 1994).  This provides strong evidence for
a yield limit significantly lower than theoretical potential.
 However, we might apply the logistic growth principle in a more modest way by assuming that it
will ultimately be possible to triple yields in regions now producing at relatively low yields: for example, to
raise yields from 2 MT/ha to 6 MT/ha over a period of decades.   If this were the case, an adequate supply
of food would be available for a doubled population with about a 50% per capita consumption increase.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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 It turns out, however, that there are very significant differences in the growth paths necessary to achieve
this goal, depending on whether we assume an exponential or a logistic pattern of yield growth.
Table 1 compares historical rates of yield growth for major grain-producing nations to the rates
which would be required to triple yields by the year 2060.   If we assume an exponential pattern of yield
growth, as many economic models do, the rates required are similar to historically observed yield growth
rates for the period 1961-1995.   But with a logistic pattern, the required initial rates are much higher, well
beyond the range of historical experience.   A logistic curve fitted to the observed yield growth yields about
a doubling of yields by 2060, rather than a tripling.   This is a crucial difference in projecting food
demand/supply balances for the twenty-first century.    
Do we believe, then, in an exponential or a logistic pattern for yield growth?   The answer to this
question will largely determine our degree of optimism about regional and planetary carrying capacity. 
Most studies concur that there is limited scope for expansion of land area cultivated -- future growth in
output must come mainly from improved yields (Crosson and Anderson 1994, Islam 1995)3.   The logistic
patterns which fit observed trends generally indicate a potential for doubling, rather than tripling, yields over
the next fifty years.   This leaves little margin for error throughout most of the developing world, where
population is expected to double during this period.   If we examine actual yield trends, we will find further
reason for skepticism concerning the optimistic, exponential-growth projections.   
3.   YIELD TRENDS FOR MAJOR CROPS: MAIZE, WHEAT, AND RICE
Overall, world cereal yield growth rates have declined during the period since 1961 (See Figure
1).   This, of course, is generally consistent with a logistic rather than exponential growth pattern.   But we
can also discern a difference in the patterns of yield growth between presently developed and presently
developing nations -- further suggesting that the two groups of nations may be in different regions of a
logistic growth curve.   The pattern of total cereal yields for developed and developing nations from 1961
to 1995 is shown in Figure 2.    Yield growth rates in developed nations have clearly slowed.  This could
indicate that the developed nations are approaching the upper limit of a logistic curve, while the developing
nations are still on the earlier portion of the curve.  The suggestion of a logistic pattern can be seen more
clearly by examining the yield growth records for three major cereal crops:  maize, wheat, and rice.  G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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Figure 2. Total Cereal Yields 
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4 The oscillating pattern at the top of the yield growth curve is even clearer in U.S. cereal crops, especially maize
(see Figures 5 and 8).
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Figure 3 shows the secular yield growth pattern for maize in developed and developing nations.   The rate
of growth has apparently slowed almost to a standstill for developed nations since about 1980.   Since
1980, we note no net increase in yields, but a pronounced yield variability.   This is consistent with the
hypothesis that yields in developed nations have reached upper limits, and that a particular year's yield is
now determined primarily by weather or other external variables.   A recent study by Naylor, Falcon, and
Zavaleta (1997) provides statistical support for this empirical observation; they also suggest that high-yield
cultivars are especially susceptible to weather-related yield variations4.
      
Developing nations' maize yields are steadily increasing, and currently less than half developed
nation levels.   This clearly leaves considerable margin for further growth in developing nations, but in the
range of doubling rather than tripling yields.  To do much better, we would have to share Waggoner's
optimistic view that not only can yields continue to rise significantly in developed nations, but that these
gains can be transmitted to developing nations. 
Figure 4 shows the story for wheat yields.   Here also developed country yields seem to show a
slowdown in growth, with an actual decline over the last five years.   But in the case of wheat, developing
countries also appear to show some slowdown, and their achieved levels are much closer to those of
developed nations.   This leaves less margin for growth in either developing or developed nations.   These
trends, of course, could be reversed -- but the dose of optimism necessary to project this is larger for
wheat than for maize.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
     
5 Japanese rice yields also appear to display a greater variability, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
weather and other external factors dominate the determination of yields in specific years once technological
possibilities for boosting yields have been fully exploited.  
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India, Paddy Rice Yields
In Asia, where rice is of particular importance, the pattern of yield growth for major nations is
shown in Figure 5.   Japanese yields have been stagnant for the last quarter-century, at about 6 Mt/ha5.
 Taiwan and China have increased yield steadily, and are now approaching the Japanese level.   Indonesian
rice yields have grown more slowly, and are now about two-thirds of Japanese levels, while Indian rice
yields have reached about half the Japanese benchmark.  These data are suggestive of a ceiling on yields,
represented by intensive Japanese cultivation, with other major producers approaching this ceiling.   This
is consistent with agronomic research indicating that the climate-adjusted yield potential for rice in Asia is
8.6 MT/ha, but that production of rice on a commercial scale rarely exceeds 80% of theoretical potential
(Cassman and Harwood, 1995).
Thus for all three of these major cereal crops, the observed pattern of yield growth is more
consistent with a logistic than an exponential trend.   If indeed the developed nations are in the top portion
of a logistic curve, we cannot expect dramatic further gains in yields for these countries (with the possible
exception of the former Soviet Union, where gross inefficiencies have reduced agricultural productivity).
 We can also expect that the developing nations which have done well recently in raising yields may have
trouble sustaining their recent growth rates (China in particular bears watching in this regard).   Two "yield
gaps" still remain to be exploited:  the difference between theoretically achievable and achieved levels in
high-yield countries, and the difference between presently high-yield and presently lower-yield countries.
 But the size of these gaps may be limited, and for some regions these limits may be quite stringent.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
     
6 See projections in Harris, 1996, based on Population Reference Bureau (1996) and U.N. (1996) medium variant
population projections.
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4. SOME REGIONAL ISSUES
Assuming modest demand growth, a rough doubling of cereal yields throughout the developing
world would be necessary for self-sufficiency in the year 2025, with an estimated 2025 world population
of just over 8 billion, including 7 billion in the presently developing world6   These projections are consistent
with estimates of slightly more than doubled cereal demand in developing nations by 2025 (Alexandratos
and de Haen, 1995).  A logistic yield growth trend probably allows for about a doubling of developing
nation yields, but leaves little further room for growth -- a major concern if we extend our projection period
to 2050, when current U.N. medium projections indicate a world population between nine and ten billion,
with over eight billion in the currently developing nations (United Nations, 1996).   Imports from developed
nations could serve as a safety valve;  almost all projections show net imports by the developing world at
least doubling by 2025 (See e.g. Islam ed., 1995).   But of course in order to supply these imports, the
developed world must increase production, boosting either yields or area cultivated.   There are also
significant economic implications to permanent import dependence, especially for the least developed
nations.   The logistic analysis suggests that the world food supply/demand balance could tighten
significantly during this period.   While there is no necessary indication of massive shortfalls, even a modest
tightening can drive prices up sharply (we have seen a recent example of this in the 1996 cereal price spike
when wheat and corn prices doubled).
Moving from a global to a regional perspective, we find wide differences both in population growth
rates and in agricultural yield trends for major crops.   It is important, therefore, to consider the picture for
large regions.   In each region the nature of the problem, and the probable constraints on carrying capacity,
are different.   
In AFRICA, yields are generally low, and rates of yield growth are also low.   F.A.O. data show
cereal yields in Africa barely increasing over the last fifteen years (F.A.O., 1994).   The pattern of Kenyan
maize yields shown in Figure 6 is typical of the virtually flat yield growth record for much of Africa.   This
leaves a large theoretical yield gap to be exploited.   However, rates of population growth in Africa are the
highest in the world, with a population doubling projected by 2025, and close to a tripling likely by 2050
(Population Reference Bureau, 1996;  United Nations, 1996).   Concerns here are centered on the
institutional difficulties of reversing a long-term low yield growth trend, as well as on water limits throughout
much of the region.   For self-sufficiency, Africa would need to nearly triple yields by 2025, and quadruple
them by 2050, assuming a 0.5% rate of per capita consumption growth to overcome current nutritional
insufficiency and a 1% per annum rate of cultivated land expansion (Harris, 1996).   If this yield growth is
not feasible, the gap will have to be filled by a massive increase in imports, which many poorer AfricanG-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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nations can ill afford.
In EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA the importance of rice and the relatively narrow exploitable
gap in rice yields suggest limits to population carrying capacity; rates of population growth are slower here,
but at least 300 million people will be added by 2025 (Population Reference Bureau, 1996).  Chinese rice
yields, as we have noted, are approaching the Japanese level, which may represent an achievable
maximum.   Maize yields in China have risen steadily, approaching U.S. levels (Figure 6); wheat yields
have now surpassed U.S. levels (Figure 7).  Wheat yields can rise significantly higher under favorable
rainfall conditions, as shown by French and British yields of around 6-7 MT/Ha, but water supply is a
major constraint on rainfed wheat.   G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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In SOUTH ASIA, a steady rate of growth in Indian wheat yields (Figure 7) has also equalled the
U.S. yield level; water constraints here will certainly be a major issue for future yield growth.   Rice yields
could in theory double to Japanese levels (Figure 5); again the water constraint is important.   South Asia
will certainly need to double overall cereal yields to accommodate population and demand growth;
sustaining the steady yield growth to date will require extensive investment in irrigation, and will pose
problems of absolute water limits, and competition between agriculture, industry, and urban areas for
available supplies.
In LATIN AMERICA, average cereal yields are now around 2.5 metric tons (Figure 8).
Population and demand growth through 2025 could be accommodated by raising these averages to the
current U.S. average level of 4-5 MT/Ha.  To achieve this would require the appropriate inputs of water
and nutrients as well as institutional infrastructure.    A considerable degree of agronomic and institutional
optimism is required to project that this will in fact be achieved and sustained throughout the region.      
Thus several strong caveats apply to a projection of doubling yields in the developing world:
** The rice yield gap for major countries does not appear to be great, putting projections of a
doubling of rice yields in doubt.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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** The yield gap for rainfed wheat is also small, and the potential for duplicating the performance
of current high-yield nations is limited by weather conditions.
** There is a possibility, but no guarantee, of further growth in yields in the already high-yield
nations.   The yield patterns for intensive rice agriculture in Japan and intensive maize cultivation in the U.S.
suggest that some practical yield ceilings exist not far above present levels. 
** Water supplies represent a significant constraint on yield growth throughout much of Africa and
Asia.
** In a context of limited rather than unlimited yield growth, productivity losses to erosion and soil
degradation bulk larger.   The pattern of the past thirty-five years, where such losses are overwhelmed by
steady and rapid yield growth, no longer applies.
** The environmental damages associated with intensive agriculture -- including soil degradation,
fertilizer and pesticide runoff, water pollution and overdraft -- all become more difficult to manage when
demand pressures militate against such measures as crop rotation, fallowing, and low-input techniques.
** The ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss associated with the spread of cultivation onto
marginal lands will also be more prevalent in a high-demand scenario.   
These conclusions are very different from the supply-side optimism characteristic of most
econometric projection models.   A picture emerges of a world approaching absolute carrying capacity
limits over the next few decades, with binding regional constraints -- even if everything goes right in terms
of agricultural investment and institutional infrastructure.   It is also important to recall that the goal of feeding
8 billion people must not merely be achieved, but must be sustained, taking into account such cumulative
problems as soil erosion, agriculture's direct and indirect contribution to greenhouse gas accumulation, and
depletion of groundwater supplies.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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5.   IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF AGROECOSYSTEMS
Given the reality of ecological limits, the central question is the feasibility of an ecologically
sustainable agriculture which can support a population of about 8 billion, and of a population policy which
can avert any much higher growth.   Rather than viewing the global agricultural system like an industrial
production process with a goal of ever higher productivity, we must see it as a modified system of natural
productivity subject to specific limits.   While the photosynthetic limit of area productivity is far above
current yields, much more stringent limits apply to most areas in practice.   The "harvest index" for grains --
the proportion of plant biomass which can be devoted to edible seed -- has already approached the
physiological limit in Green Revolution grains (Brown, 1997;  Evans, 1980, 1993, referenced in Brown
1997).   Across wide areas, soil quality and water availability further limit yield potential.   The management
focus must accordingly shift from increasing productivity to maintaining the conditions under which present
yields can be sustained in current high-yield areas, and improving yields in current low-yield regions through
methods which do not undermine natural productivity.
There is now a burgeoning literature on agroecological techniques which can sustain high yields
without degrading soils and depleting or polluting water supplies (see e.g. Lockeretz et al. 1981; Patrinquin
1986; National Research Council 1989; Edwards et al. 1990; Altieri 1995; Thrupp 1996; Hanson et al
1997).  The evidence that organic agriculture can sustain yields comparable to those of intensive high-input
techniques is, however, more developed for temperate areas with good soils such as the United States and
Europe.   Good principles and techniques for sustainable agriculture in tropical areas have been
documented (see e.g. Section IV, "Sustainable Agricultural Systems in the Tropics" in Edwards et al, 1990
and "Case Studies" section in Thrupp 1996), but the question of whether these areas can attain yields
similar to current high-yield regions is still open.
Extensive evidence exists as to the impacts of current agricultural techniques in degrading soils,
depleting and polltuing water supplies, overloading the ecosystem with nitrate runoff, and promoting the
development of resistant pest species (Pimentel ed. 1993; Postel 1992;  Smil 1997; Bull 1982).   The
correction of these systemic problems through agroecological techniques must rank as a goal of at least as
great importance as increases in agricultural productivity.    In the light of the evidence on yield growth
patterns presented in this paper, the achievement of these two goals during a period when world population
grows towards 8 billion would be a massive accomplishment, and clearly presses against the outer limits
of planetary possibilities.     
If we accept this rough indication of carrying capacity limits, patterns of population growth become
critical.  Projections, of course, are only projections;  most median estimates of world population for the
year 2025 are around 8 billion, but with a range of about 1 billion between the lowest and highest
projections for that year.   The disparity becomes dramatically larger for 2050; the most recent U.N. series
shows a low estimate for 2050 of 7.7 billion (implying that world population growth will have peaked andG-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
     
7 See e.g. Brown 1997, in which F.A.O. and U.S.D.A. data on increasing animal protein consumption and feedgrain
use are reviewed (F.A.O. 1987, U.S.D.A. 1996, 1997).
     
8 Brown (1997) reviews U.S.D.A. data showing that China's feedgrain use increased from less than 20 million tons
in 1978 to more than 100 million tons in 1997.   Feedgrains now represent about one quarter of China's total grain
consumption.
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begun to decline by 2050), and a high estimate of 11.2 billion (United Nations, 1996; Population Reference
Bureau, 1997).   Our analysis of yield trends implies that while the lower figure is within carrying capacity
subject to reasonable assumptions, the higher figure is not.   Even the U.N. medium estimate of 9.4 billion
for 2050 seriously strains carrying capacity on the assumption of logistical trends in grain yields.   Chen and
Kates, who favor a higher-range population estimate, suggest a "normative" requirement of a three- to four-
fold increase in food supplies for nutritional security in 2060 (Chen and Kates, 1994).   This is clearly
outside the range of reasonable expectations given logistical yield trends.    
Some analysts, such as Seckler and Cox (1994) view the "low" series as the most likely long-term
estimate of global population trends, given observed patterns of fertility decline.   If this is borne out, the
prospects for maintaining adequate food supplies would clearly be much brighter.   But as we move
towards the median or high population growth variants, the likelihood of greater environmental damage and
biodiversity loss, as well as the possibility of serious food shortages, becomes much greater.   Any supply
shortfall, of course, would lead to food price increases affecting the world's poorest peoples most severely.
  
The other important demand-side variable is per capita consumption.   Economic growth has
generally been associated with increased demand for feedgrains, which greatly increases the overall income
elasticity of demand for grains7.   The demand projections discussed above assume a modest
(approximately 0.5% per annum) increase in demand for cereals throughout the developing world.    A
pattern of steady increase in meat and dairy product consumption  could easily double this estimated growth
rate (the recent trends in Chinese direct and indirect cereal consumption bear this out8).  Thus a lower
population projection could easily be offset by more rapid per capita demand growth.    
The lack of upper limits in most economic models of agricultural growth leads to an excessive
emphasis on expansion of production, and an insufficient consideration of environmental constraints and
the need for population limits.   A logistical growth model, for which there is strong supportive evidence,
should lead us to focus instead on environmentally sustainable production techniques, efficiency in
consumption, and measures to limit population growth.G-DAE Working Paper No. 01-04: “Agriculture in a Global Perspective”
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